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Abstract. Instrumentalists about need believe that all needs are instrumental, i.e., 
ontologically dependent upon ends, goals or purposes. Absolutists view some needs as 
non-instrumental. The aims of this article are: clearly to characterize the 
instrumentalism/absolutism debate that is of concern (mainly §1); to establish that both 
positions have recent and current adherents (mainly §1); to bring what is, in comparison 
with prior literature, a relatively high level of precision to the debate, employing some 
hitherto neglected, but important, insights (passim); to show, on grounds not previously 
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to the fore in the literature, that insofar as instrumentalism’s advocates have provided 
arguments for the position, these are unsound (§2); to argue against instrumentalism 
using a new  dilemma concerning whether ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are interpreted in 
a mentalistic manner (§3); to elucidate the implications of the needs/need-satisfiers and 
preconditions/means distinctions for the debate (§4). 
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1. Instrumentalism and absolutism about needs 
 
An instrumental need is a need that is had because of a certain end, goal or purpose. 
Were there no ends, goals or purposes, there could be no instrumental needs. At the time 
of writing this, I need (and have) a comfortable environment in which to write. I have 
this need not just because my having a comfortable environment is a necessary 
condition for my being able to exercise my ability to write, but because I currently aim 
to make progress with some writing. The necessary connection between having a 
comfortable environment and being able to do this ought not to be confused with the 
occurrent need for a comfortable environment itself: the former obtains even when 
writing is not one of the abilities I wish to exercise (and so when I am not in occurrent 
need of a comfortable environment, at least not for that purpose; compare Thomson 
1987, p. 12; McLeod 2011, p. 213). 
Absolute needs, if there are any, do not depend upon ends, goals and purposes. 
Instrumentalists and absolutists might agree upon a conceptual distinction between 
instrumental and absolute need. Instrumentalists hold, however, that the distinction is 
empty on the absolute side. Instrumentalist work includes Barry (1965, pp. 47–49), 
Plant (1980, passim), Flew (1981, pp. 122–127), Frankfurt (1984, p. 2), Liss (1993, pp. 
46–47), Brannigan (1995, p. 310), Ohlsson (1995, pp. 96–98), Stempsey (1999, pp. 94–
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95), Crisp (2002, p. 135), Brock (2013, p. 446), Gustavsson (2014, pp. 26–27), 
Gustavsson & Sandman (2015, p. 14) and Juth (2015, p. 75).  
The absolutism that concerns us holds that there are both instrumental and 
absolute needs, with neither being a species of, or reducible to, the other. According to 
absolutism, a being can have a need that is not ontologically dependent upon ends, 
goals, or purposes (whether its own or of another being that shares its world). Absolutist 
work includes Anscombe (1958, p. 7), Feinberg, (1973, pp. 111–112), Braybrooke 
(1987, pp. 29–32), Wiggins (1991, pp. 7–9; 2005, p. 31), Thomson (1987; 2005), 
O’Neill (2005), Alvarez (2009) and McLeod (2011; 2014). An absolutist would 
typically regard as absolute such needs as, among others, our needs for food, water and 
shelter. On an absolutist understanding, while it may be within one’s power not to 
satisfy one’s absolute need it is not within one’s power to cast it off (Thomson 1987, pp. 
23–34; McLeod, 2011, p. 221; 2014, p. 294). 
The absolutism/instrumentalism distinction, as here understood, concerns 
whether all needs are ontologically dependent upon ends, goals or purposes. While both 
positions regard claims of need as truth-apt and neither regards them as systematically 
false, neither position is primarily about matters semantic. They do not, of themselves, 
entail differing commitments over whether the verb ‘need’ has more than one sense and 
they are not about which, if any, claims of need are normative (in a sense relevant to 
morals). The fact that arguments for the absoluteness of some needs have been given 
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(e.g., Thomson 1987, pp. 2–6; Wiggins 1991, pp. 7–9) in which the premises do 
concern such semantic matters should not be allowed to obscure this point. 
Instrumentalists take all needs to have a kind of derivative status: when a being 
has a need it has it because of an end, goal or purpose (not necessarily belonging to the 
being itself). It is perhaps worth noting that instrumentalism about needs is analogous, 
in some ways, to instrumentalism about practical reasoning. Instrumentalism about 
practical reasoning is the position according to which, in the words of one of its 
opponents, ‘all practical reasoning is means-end reasoning’ and ‘practical reasoning 
proceeds from desires that are not themselves revisable by reasoning’ (Millgram, 1997, 
p. 2).1 Some of the claims of Smith (1994), who defends a ‘Humean’ (otherwise known 
as ‘instrumentalist’) view about motivating reasons, are strongly analogous to some of 
the claims made by those who adopt an instrumentalist position about needs.2 Smith 
(1994, pp. 92–93, 116–117) holds that an agent has a motivating reason if and only if 
the agent has a desire for, or to do, something and that desire is suitably accompanied by 
a means-end belief about what would bring about the desire’s satisfaction. On Smith’s 
account, motivating reasons cannot exist but for desires. An instrumentalist about needs 
holds that a being has a need if and only if the being has an end, goal or purpose and 
there is an accompanying fact about what must happen in order for it to be attained or 
brought about: needs cannot exist but for ends, goals and purposes. Smith (1994, p. 116) 
presents his view that ‘[h]aving a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal’ as 
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something that ‘seems unassailable’ and which ‘has the status of a conceptual truth’. 
Similarly, advocates of instrumentalism about needs tend to present the view as though 
it were an axiom of theorizing about need (e.g., Frankfurt 1984, pp. 2–3; Brock 2013, p. 
446).  
Shortly, a more probing characterization of instrumentalism about needs will be 
offered than has so far arisen in the literature and specific works will be discussed in 
more detail. The citations so far show that both absolutism about needs and 
instrumentalism about needs have current supporters.  
Lest the instrumentalism/absolutism distinction be thought spurious, or logically 
weaker than it actually is, let us note a crucial landmark in the conceptual territory: that 
absolutism is not instrumentalism-by-the-back-door. When an absolutist regards an 
absolute need as a need that must be met for harm to be avoided, this does not result in 
collapse of the absolute/instrumental distinction. Some beings without ends, goals or 
purposes of their own, such as plants, can be harmed. Feinberg (1973, pp. 111–112) 
characterises ‘basic’ needs as those needs that must be satisfied if the being that has 
them is not to be harmed. Wiggins (1991, pp. 10, 14) characterises ‘absolute’ needs in 
terms of harm necessarily resulting if the need is not satisfied. Nevertheless, Feinberg’s 
and Wiggins’s discussions neither entail nor were intended to entail that ‘basic’ or 
‘absolute’ needs are instrumental (albeit not necessarily to the satisfaction of ends, 
goals, or purposes of the entity with the needs). Absolutism does not deny that all needs 
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are related to outcomes. Rather, it denies that all needs are dependent on ends, goals and 
purposes. Ends, goals and purposes can occur only as the ends, goals and purposes of 
entities able to have them: they essentially belong to agents and substances. Outcomes 
may be outcomes for agents and substances. Outcomes may be of events, processes and 
states of affairs. Whereas ends, goals and purposes must be of agents and substances, 
outcomes cannot be of agents or substances. The basic/absolute needs of a plant are not 
dependent, on the accounts of Feinberg and Wiggins, on any ends, goals or purposes, 
for a plant has these needs regardless of whether anyone cares about whether the plant is 
harmed or not: compare here Anscombe (1958, p. 7). An absolutist denies that all needs 
are, in one way (by being dependent upon the needful being’s own ends, goals or 
purposes), or in another (by being dependent upon the ends, goals and purposes of a 
being that shares the needful being’s world), instrumental. To claim that Feinberg’s and 
Wiggins’s position on the relationship between need and harm means that, whether 
knowingly or not, they view all needs as instrumental would be to fall into a confusion 
likely to prevent anyone in its grip from understanding the absolutist position on its own 
terms.3 
The debate between absolutism and instrumentalism about needs bears upon 
debates in moral philosophy. For example, the instrumentalist’s contention that needs 
are had only because of ends, goals or purposes, is sometimes supplemented with claims 
to the effect that needs, or true statements of need, can therefore never serve, on their 
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own, as normative reasons for action (e.g., Barry 1965, p. 48; Crisp 2002, p. 135; for the 
opposing view see, e.g., Thomson 1987; Lowe 2005). Moreover, the debate between 
instrumentalists and absolutists is relevant to the question of the relationship between 
needs and value. Instrumentalists typically hold that the value of meeting a need 
depends upon the value of the end that is thereby promoted (Taylor 1959, p. 111; Barry 
1965, pp. 48–49; Plant 1980, p. 28; Goodin 1985, pp. 616, 621, 623; Liss 1993, p. 46). 
If needs are dependent upon ends, then ends cannot ultimately be evaluated according to 
whether they promote or frustrate the meeting of needs. By contrast, on an absolutist 
understanding, absolute needs can ‘provide a bedrock for evaluation’ (Thomson 1987, 
p. xi) in that the satisfaction of a subject’s absolute needs ‘cannot be less important than 
the quality [of the subject’s] life’ (Thomson 1987, p. 127). Nevertheless, it is upon the 
supposed ontological dependency of needs upon ends, goals and purposes (howsoever 
construed), that this article will focus. Whatever clarity the discussion brings to this 
issue might be helpful for subsequent work in moral philosophy. Let ‘A needs X/to V’ 
stand for any need claim that is of the form ‘A needs X’ or of the form ‘A needs to V’. 
The instrumentalist tends to be committed to the following four theses: 
 
(T1) Whenever it is a fact that A needs X/to V, then, for some F, A needs X/to V 
in order to F. 
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(T2) For all true claims of the form ‘A needs X/to V’, ‘A needs X/to V’ is 
elliptical for ‘A needs X/to V in order to F’.4 
 
(T3) In (T1) and (T2), ‘F’ ranges only over ends, goals and purposes. 
 
(T4) Whenever a being has a need, the need ontologically depends upon an end, 
goal or purpose (either of the being itself or of another being that shares the 
being’s world).5 
 
Writers who support (T3) tend to leave it unclear as to whether by ‘end’, ‘goal’ 
or ‘purpose’, they mean the kind of ends, goals and purposes that only minded beings 
can have.6 An end, goal or purpose, in this sense, is consciously intended or 
contemplated, though not necessarily at will, by an agent.7 In contrast, Hacker (2007, p. 
131) writes: 
 
The organs of a plant have a purpose or a function, which is their contribution to 
maintaining the normal life and reproductive cycle of the plant. But a plant itself 
cannot be said to have purposes of its own or to pursue goals. Nevertheless, what 
a plant does is explained teleologically – that is, as being done for the sake of a 
goal (to obtain more light or water) or for a certain purpose (e.g. to facilitate 
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pollination). But these goals and purposes are not goals and purposes of the 
plant. The teleological behaviour of plants is explicable in non-teleological 
terms. 
 
While Hacker (2003, p. 136) maintains that whatever is needed ‘is needed for an 
end’, in his terminology, ends, goals and purposes include the contributions that organs 
make to normal functioning, outcomes relating to an organism’s natural activities, the 
functions that artefacts are fashioned to perform and the desires, plans and ambitions of 
agents with volitional powers (Hacker 2003, pp. 128, 133). For an organism to have 
needs, it is not necessary for it to be sentient, to have volitional powers or to have goals 
of its own: the needs of plants include natural needs (Hacker 2003, p. 130). Thus, 
Hacker does not appear to suggest that all needs ontologically depend upon ends, goals 
or purposes. His position here serves to make clear the ambiguity of (T3) and (T4) and 
to show that there is an alternative to what is perhaps the more obvious, mentalistic, 
reading of them. 
Let us consider the logical relationships between (T1)–(T4). (T1) does not entail 
(T2). One might admit that whatever is needed is needed for something (which is a 
paraphrase of (T1)) whilst also holding, without inconsistency, that some claims of need 
of the form ‘A needs X/to V’ are semantically complete (i.e., true or false just as they 
are). (T1) and (T2) together do not entail (T3). One might hold that the ‘F’ ranges over 
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outcomes or states of affairs, rather than over ends, goals and purposes. (If the ‘F’ were 
to range over states of affairs then (T1) and (T2) would have to be modified so as to 
replace ‘in order to F’ with ‘in order that F’ or something similar.) The exponent of (T4) 
has it that for any need it depends for its existence upon an end, goal or purpose. (T1)–
(T3) together do not entail (T4), for ontological dependency is an asymmetrical matter 
about which (T1)–(T3) are silent. 
Now the debate between instrumentalists and absolutists does not hinge upon 
whether the schema (T1) properly applies to all needs claims, or, more informally, upon 
the question of whether everything that is needed is needed for something. The 
contention that everything that is needed is needed for something is consistent with 
absolutism. Instrumentalists tend to miss this crucial point, upon which §2 expands.8 An 
absolutist can agree that each true need claim can be analysed in terms of (T1)’s schema 
but the absolutist will deny that the F-place must always be filled by an end, goal or 
purpose.9 
Commitment to (T1)–(T4) is reasonably attributable to Barry (1965), Ohlsson 
(1995) and, more definitely, Flew (1981), Plant (1980), Liss (1993) and Crisp (2002). 
Taylor (1959) and Frankfurt (1984) also seem to be committed to all four theses, though 
they do not make explicit appeal to the notion of one sentence’s being elliptical for 
another.10 Taking each thesis in turn, here are some quotations and references.  
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‘Whenever someone says “x is needed” it always makes sense…to ask what 
purpose it is needed for’, writes Barry (1965, p. 48). Several other writers, such as Flew 
(1981, p. 120), Plant (1980, p. 26), Liss (1993, p. 11), Ohlsson (1995, p. 95) and 
Gustavsson & Sandman (2015, p. 14) also make remarks that entail (T1). 
Though Barry (1965, p. 47) remarks that the extent to which ‘linguistic propriety 
demands that the end be supplied in the sentence’ is a matter of degree, he suggests that 
it is an error ‘to suppose that a need can somehow be established independently of an 
end’. Barry does not make explicit appeal to the notion of one’s sentence’s being 
elliptical for another, but Thomson (1987, p. 130, note 23) and Brandon (1993, p. 128) 
interpret him, quite reasonably, as a supporter of (T2). Flew remarks that ‘to say that 
this or that is needed is to say that it is a necessity for the fulfilment of some function, or 
purpose, or end’ (1981, p. 121). According to Plant (1980, p. 27) ‘for any claim 
to…need to be intelligible, the end or purpose [for which the thing needed is needed] 
must be specified’. Liss (1993, p. 48), Ohlsson (1995) and Gustavsson & Sandman 
(2015, p. 14) also support (T2). 
‘Needs are means to ends: a subject always needs something for some purpose’, 
writes Plant (1980, p. 244). Thus, Plant is among those who are committed to (T3). 
Barry (1965, p. 48), Flew (1981, p. 122), Ohlsson (1995, p. 95) and Gustavsson & 
Sandman (2015, p. 14) are also so committed. For his part, Liss (1993, pp. 45–47) takes 
all statements of the form ‘A needs X in order to F’ to refer to goals, committing 
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himself to (T3), and remarks, in a vivid illustration of (T4), that ‘if there is no goal to 
have a need for’ then there is ‘no need’. 
In his discussion of needs, Barry’s main aim is to establish that needs, or true 
claims of need, do not, by themselves, provide justifying reasons for action (1965, p. 
48). Nevertheless, Barry (1965, pp. 47–49) also seems to endorse (T4), as do 
Gustavsson & Sandman (2015, p. 14). Plant (1980, p. 29) appears to take it that basic 
needs of human beings are ‘generated’ by desired goals and purposes and that a need is 
had because of a goal or purpose. Liss (1993, p. 46) has it that the existence of a goal is 
a necessary condition for the existence of a need, but that goals can exist without there 
being needs. Ohlsson (1995, pp. 94, 95) holds both that the noun ‘need’, when it does 
not mean ‘fundamental drive’, means ‘necessary condition for some goal’ and, going 
further than (T4), that a being has a need only if that same being has a goal. §2 provides 
evidence that Flew (1981) also endorses (T4). 
In the writings of those to whom (T1)–(T4) have been attributed, it is more or 
less unclear whether by ‘ends’, ‘goals’ and ‘purposes’ they mean something mental. 
Neither Barry (1965) nor Ohlsson (1995) addresses this issue and it is not easy to tell 
what they mean by the terminology. On the other hand, Flew (1981) appears, as we 
shall see in the next section, to take needs to depend upon desires. Plant (1980, p. 29) 
appears to suggest that only humans with desires can have ‘basic or human needs’, since 
he construes the question of ‘whether there are basic or human needs’ as one that is to 
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be answered via the question of ‘whether there are certain goals and purposes that all 
persons desire and that are wanted as ends in themselves’. While recognizing the 
distinction between what a person wants and what they need, and that a person can need 
a certain good without knowing that they need it, Liss (1993, pp. 54–55) appears to take 
needing to be dependent upon wanting.11 If he means something non-psychological by 
‘goal’, this is not evident. Liss (1993, pp. 46, 48) remarks that someone without goals 
would have no needs and that someone who does not want food because he intends to 
starve himself to death does not need food. 
Instrumentalists and absolutists can agree that the common noun ‘need’ has an 
extension: that is, that there are such entities as needs.12 The instrumentalist holds, and 
the absolutist denies, that ‘instrumental need’ and ‘need’ are co-extensive noun phrases. 
The instrumentalist is committed to the hard generalization that there are no needs that 
could exist even if there were no ends, goals or purposes. Sometimes, this appears to be 
on the basis that it is somehow a conceptual truth that all needs are instrumental.13 To 
take instrumentalism to be a conceptual truth, however, is to preclude oneself from 
saying that, while conceptually coherent on both sides, the instrumental need/absolute 
need distinction is empty on the absolute side. In the debate about whether the extension 
of the common noun ‘need’ includes needs that are non-instrumental, any premise to the 
effect that it is a conceptual truth that all needs are instrumental would obviously beg 
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the question. Moreover, if absolutism is conceptually incoherent then its incoherence 
has yet to be demonstrated in the literature. 
 
2. Instrumentalism and ‘what for?’ 
 
When a claim of the form ‘A needs X/to V’ is made, the hearer may ask a question of 
the form ‘What does A need X/to V for?’. Instrumentalists about need typically take this 
point to support their position, sometimes to the point of being sufficient for it: ‘The 
thing needed is always needed for something: need is instrumental’ (Liss 1993, p. 49). 
Barry (1964, p. 48) claims that whenever a sentence of the form ‘X is needed’ is 
asserted, ‘it always makes sense…to ask what purpose it is needed for’. Barry appears 
to attempt to draw a contrast between such sentences and sentences of the form ‘A 
needs X’, where A is a person. In the latter, unlike the former, thinks Barry (1964, p. 
49), ‘the ends to which’ the sentence ‘may refer are limited’. Whether or not Barry 
succeeds in drawing such a contrast, his remarks about sentences of the form ‘A needs 
X’ when A is a person do not appear to amount to a rejection of the view that it always 
makes sense, for any needs claim, to ask a ‘What for?’ question. Moreover, he asserts 
(but does not argue) that in all cases the needs are ‘still derivative’ in the sense of being 
dependent on ends. 
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Even if questions of the form ‘What does A need X/to V for?’ are pertinent to all 
need claims of the form ‘A needs X/to V’, this does not establish that all needs are 
dependent upon ends. We will show this via discussion of some of Flew’s remarks 
about need. For Flew (1981, p. 123), there is a ‘logical link between a person’s need and 
that same person’s wants’. Flew’s wider discussion suggests that this amounts to needs 
being dependent upon desires, where these may be ‘hypothetical and ideal […] rather 
than actual desires’ (1981, p. 125). Flew (1981, pp. 123–125) suggests that our 
occurrent needs are dependent upon our actual or hypothetical desires and that the needs 
of a person rendered incapable of having occurrent desires depend upon desires the 
person would have if they were not thus incapacitated. 
Flew provides no very clear or direct arguments for instrumentalism, but the 
following passage is suggestive of some arguments:  
 
…what is needed…is needed…as a means to the fulfilment of some further 
function, purpose or end….if I say that I need something, it is never inept to ask: 
‘What for?’ I need food and drink in order to maintain life and health; I need a 
lift in order to get me to Manchester in the morning; and so on….  
…there is always something hypothetically imperative about any need. 
For to say that this or that is needed is to say that it is a necessity for the 
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fulfilment of some function, or purpose, or end: if I want any of those 
fulfilments then I must have those necessities. (Flew 1981, pp. 120–121)14 
 
Two valid, but unsound, arguments for instrumentalism can be reconstructed from this 
passage. Here is the first:  
 
1. Whenever a claim of the form ‘A needs X’ is asserted, ‘it is never inept to 
ask: “What for?”’15 
2. The proper answer to a question of the form ‘What does A need X for?’ is a 
sentence of the form ‘A needs X in order to F’. 
3. Sentences of the form ‘A needs X in order to F’ refer to ‘some further 
function, purpose, or end’. 
4. If A needs X in order to F and F is some function, purpose or end, then A’s 
need is hypothetically imperative rather than absolute.16 
5. No true sentences of the form ‘A needs X’ concern absolute needs. (From 1, 
2, 3, 4) 
6. If there were any absolute needs, then some true sentences of the form ‘A 
needs X’ would concern them. 
7. There are no absolute needs. (From 5, 6) 
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Premise 4 can be refuted by counter-example. The idea of the hypothetically 
imperative is, as Flew writes, the idea of that which one must do or have given that one 
has certain desires: for example, one must practise if one wants to become an excellent 
musician. If A needs X in order to F and F is a function, then since functions are not 
dependent for their existence on desires (von Wright 1963, pp. 52–54), it need not be 
the case that A’s need for X is a hypothetical one. Whether or not I want to breathe, I 
need oxygen in order to breathe. So naturally it follows that if I want to breathe then I 
must have oxygen. That hypothetical imperative depends for its truth on the absolute 
truth that oxygen is necessary for breathing. (The ‘for’ here does not suggest an end: see 
below.) The force of the ‘must’ in the hypothetical imperative relies on a necessity that 
is not hypothetical. The case shows that when I have an instrumental need, this is 
sometimes because I have an absolute need and I want to do what satisfaction of that 
absolute need enables me to do. There is no eliminating the absolute need in favour of a 
need that is purely instrumental: rather, the absolute need is, in this case, a condition 
upon the possibility of the instrumental need. 
A second, simpler, argument can be reconstructed from Flew’s remarks: 
 
1. If there were absolute needs then there would be some sentences of the form 
‘A needs X’ such that it would be ‘inept to ask: “What for?”’. 
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2. There are no sentences of the form ‘A needs X’ such that it would be ‘inept 
to ask: “What for?”’ 
3. No needs are absolute. (From 1, 2) 
 
Premise 1 here is too strong. Some absolutists take it that in some contexts, claims 
of the form ‘A needs X’ have it built into their semantics as to what A needs X for. For 
example, Thomson (1987, p. 15) holds that in these cases what A needs X for is the 
avoidance of harm. This view does not of itself entail that it is sometimes ‘inept’ to ask 
‘What for?’ in relation to a claim of need. 
Suppose we have a claim of the form ‘A needs X’, e.g., ‘Brown needs food’. Smith 
asks what Brown needs food for. Jones says that Brown needs food for survival while 
McAdam says that Brown needs food for a party. Now the debate moves a step back, to 
the phrase ‘necessary for’. Flew (1981, pp. 120–121) has it, in effect, that claims of the 
form ‘A needs X’ are always elliptical for claims of the form ‘A needs X in order to F’. 
Claims of the latter form entail, on his account, claims of the form ‘If A is (as intended) 
to F then A must have X’. As has already been noted, the force of this ‘must’ cannot 
come from A’s desire to F alone. It requires also that A’s having X is necessary for A’s 
F-ing. Now that necessity for is not in any way a product of A’s desire. That sort of 
desire-independent necessity for is something to which the absolutist about need is well-
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advised to appeal. The phrase ‘necessary for’ has instrumental and non-instrumental 
usages. The following examples show this.17 
 
(1) It is necessary for me to obtain a ticket to Liverpool. 
(2) It is necessary for me to have physical parts. 
 
Suppose that both (1) and (2) are asserted. We can paraphrase the sentences as: 
 
(3) I need a ticket to Liverpool. 
(4) I need to have physical parts. 
 
Now suppose I am an organism and suppose that organisms necessarily have physical 
parts. In this case, (4) is true. (4), however, is not indicative of a need, or at least of the 
kind of need that is of interest in moral and political philosophy.18 Having physical parts 
is not something I can lack and yet continue (however briefly) to exist. The ethically 
interesting needs are among those needs that can go unsatisfied without this resulting in 
the immediate perishing of their bearers. The absolute usages of the phrase ‘necessary 
for’ however, are of interest because they point to cases of natural necessity. Typically, 
to say, for example, that it is necessary for Brown to eat in order to survive is not to 
introduce a teleological usage of ‘in order to’. Rather, it is to claim that it is impossible 
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for Brown to survive without eating: this claim is teleological neither in fact nor in 
appearance. Whether or not absolutism is correct, the arguments for instrumentalism 
that are in the literature are unsound, for they rely upon the falsehood that necessity for 
must be teleological. 
 
3. A dilemma for instrumentalism 
 
Either ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’, as they occur in (T3) and (T4), are to be taken to be 
restricted to the ends, goals and purposes that only minded beings can have as their own 
or they are to have wider, ‘functional’ reference. 
If ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ refer to ends, goals and purposes that only minded 
beings can have as their own, then instrumentalism has the implausible consequence 
that only minded beings can have needs of their own. If, on the other hand, ‘end’, ‘goal’ 
and ‘purpose’ are not meant to refer only to the ends, goals and purposes that only 
minded beings can have as their own, then (T1)–(T3) are consistent with absolutism and 
it remains the case that the dependency indicated in (T4) cannot obtain. 
On the first horn of this dilemma, ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are understood not 
merely as outcomes, but as endeavours that are essentially conceived of, and possibly 
pursued, by agents.19 The claim that needs are dependent upon ends, in this sense, 
commits its exponent to the view that need is a mind-dependent phenomenon.20 On this 
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view, a world without minded beings would be a world without need. For the absolutist, 
on the other hand, while the satisfaction of those needs the absolutist regards as absolute 
may be necessary for the continued pursuit of an agent’s desires (whatever their 
content), it is not this relationship between needs and desires in virtue of which the 
needs exist.21 For the absolutist, there can be organisms that have needs of their own but 
no desires. On this horn of the dilemma, absolutism has a strong presumptive 
correctness that no known arguments for instrumentalism come close to being powerful 
enough to overcome. As well as conferring instrumental needs upon the plants they look 
after, gardeners and farmers aim to know and to tend to the natural needs of the plants: 
the natural needs of plants do not typically arise from any human aims or projects 
(Attfield 1981, pp. 36–43; Hacker 2007, p. 130). No-one who accepts this can, on the 
first horn of the dilemma, regard instrumentalism as at all plausible. 
For the second horn of the dilemma, suppose that ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are 
to be interpreted in a teleological manner that is not restricted to conscious intentions. In 
that circumstance, the absolutist can agree with (T1)–(T3). For independent reasons, 
(T4) remains implausible. When ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are interpreted 
teleologically rather than in a mentalistic manner, with some parts of an organism and 
some of the organism’s activities being held to be explicable teleologically, it remains 
the case that it is organisms themselves that are the primary bearers of natural needs. 
The ends, goals and purposes of an organism’s organs and of its activities are explicable 
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in terms of the meeting of the organism’s natural needs, rather than being themselves 
explanatorily prior to the organism’s natural needs; moreover, the organism’s natural 
needs cannot be ontologically dependent upon those ends, goals or purposes. Those of 
an organism’s natural needs that are essential to all members of its species, which we 
may call its ‘natural species needs’, such as my need for water, can only exist if the 
organism itself exists but they do not depend for their existence upon the organism.22 If 
the needs were ontologically dependent upon the organism then, given the asymmetry 
of ontological dependency, the organism could exist without having them. An organism 
and that organism’s natural species needs are, of necessity, co-existent: there is 
therefore no relationship of ontological dependency, in either direction, between them. 
Now even if it is supposed that a plant itself, for example, has ends, goals or purposes of 
its own, none of these can be ontologically prior to all of the plant’s natural needs: in 
order for the ends, goals or purposes to be ontologically prior to the plant’s natural 
species needs, the ends, goals or purposes would have to be ontologically prior to the 
plant itself, which contradicts the supposition that they are the plant’s own. 
In fact, no party to the debate seems to suppose that plants have ends, goals and 
purposes of their own. Granting that plants do not have their own ends, goals or 
purposes, the needs of plants must, on this horn of the dilemma (as on the first) depend 
upon the ends, goals and purposes of beings that do have ends, goals and purposes of 
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their own. We thus arrive at the same result as on the first horn of the dilemma: the 
instrumentalist cannot admit that plants have natural needs of their own. 
 
4. Needs, satisfiers, preconditions and means 
 
Needs are distinct from their satisfiers: for example, my need for water is distinct from 
water itself, which is the need’s satisfier (Taylor 1959, p. 106; White 1975, p. 104; 
Thomson 1987, p. 12; Wiggins 1991, p. 16; Liss 1993, pp. 44–45; Hope, Østerdal & 
Hasman 2010, p. 471; McLeod 2011, pp. 212, 219; McLeod 2014, p. 294). This 
distinction can also be illustrated by pointing to the difference, implicit in Wiggins 
(1991, pp. 2–4), between the following two questions: (i) What is it to need? (ii) What is 
needed? The first question is about the character of need. The second is about what it is 
that satisfies need. The distinction between needs and their satisfiers undermines the 
contention that needs themselves are always instrumental. Even if all needs-satisfiers 
are instruments, it does not follow that all needs are instruments. An instrument is 
something that is a means to an end: a need (as opposed to its satisfier) is not. A need is 
not of use-value to its bearer, whereas an instrument is of use-value to its user. Our 
needs cannot, in contrast with our abilities, be exercised. At least typically, our needs 
(as opposed to their satisfiers) are not useful to us as individuals.  
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It is pertinent also to note the importance of a further distinction, implicit in 
Anscombe (1958, p. 7), between preconditions and means. If I want to write a long 
book, then surviving for several more years may, for me, be a means to my end. Here it 
is my survival itself, not my need for it, which is a means. To write the book, I need to 
have a certain level of education. My being educated to that level, though partly a 
means to the end of my being capable of writing, would not normally be a means to the 
end of writing the book (and so is not, unlike, e.g., a computer purchased for the task, an 
instrument towards it). Being educated to the level in question would typically be a 
precondition for, rather than a means towards, writing the book.  
The satisfaction of some of our needs, including some desire-independent needs 
that we share with all our fellow humans, is a precondition for (and not essentially a 
means towards) the development of the capacity to formulate conscious ends. The 
meeting of certain biological needs must take place before I can even have any 
conscious ends of my own (Doyal & Gough 1991, p. 69; Alvarez 2009, p. 493). What 
is, before I am able to form my own conscious ends, a precondition for my having any 
such ends does not retrospectively become a means towards the meeting of some of 
these ends once I am able to form them. The capacity to have ends of one’s own, as 
opposed to the potentiality to develop it, only arises at a certain developmental stage. 
The phenomenon of biological need is prior to that of instrumental need, since the only 
organisms that can have ends of their own are highly evolved organisms whose 
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principal biological needs are satisfied. If needs were essentially instrumental, in that 
they depended for their existence upon there being agents with ends, whatever those 
ends might be, then this point about biological need could not be true. This appeal to the 
absoluteness of some biological needs is not intended to suggest that all absolute needs 
are biological: it may well be plausible, for example, that humans typically have some 
absolute psychological needs and some absolute needs that stem from their status as 
persons (in a more or less Kantian sense). The case is used simply because it is vivid 
and easier to think about and because instrumentalism is a hard generalization which 
one good counterexample is enough to refute. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
On a mentalistic understanding of what an end is, instrumentalism requires that every 
organism with a need either has a mentalistic end of its own or (in the case of organisms 
incapable of having such ends) has its needs thanks to the ends of other beings. 
Absolutism, on the other hand, allows for the commonsense view that organisms that 
are incapable of having mentalistic ends have needs that they would have even if there 
were no minded beings in their world. When instrumentalism is construed, alternatively, 
as a thesis about the dependency of needs on non-mentalistic ends, goals and purposes, 
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its dependency claim cannot stand up: there is no real distinction between being an 
organism and having biological needs.23 
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1 The second conjunct cannot charitably be interpreted as entailing that no desires are 
revisable by reasoning: rather, the claim is that those desires upon which practical 
reasoning ultimately depends are not themselves revisable by reasoning. See Smith 
(1994, p. 8). 
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2 On the distinction between motivating and normative reasons, see Smith (1994, pp. 
94–98). 
3 Ohlsson (1995, p. 97) writes that ‘the distinction that [absolutists] want to emphasize 
is that between necessary conditions for arbitrarily chosen goals and some goal which 
can be taken as given and presupposed by certain statements about fundamental needs’. 
On the contrary, the absolutist’s claim is that some needs do not stem from goals at all. 
Wiggins (1991, p. 10) holds that claims of absolute need of persons are equivalent to 
claims of instrumental need in which the end is harm avoidance. This does not appear to 
have been intended to entail that absolute need is a species of instrumental need: see 
McLeod (2014, p. 295). 
4 The position of Taylor (1959, pp. 109–111), who thinks that some claims of the form 
‘A needs X’ are ‘pure recommendations’, motivates the inclusion of ‘it is a fact that’ in 
(T1) and ‘true’ in (T2). 
5 Frankfurt (1984, pp. 2–3) says it is among some ‘elementary theoretical 
considerations’ about need that ‘nothing is needed except in virtue of being an 
indispensable condition for the attainment of a certain end’. This seems simultaneously 
to commit him to (T3) and (T4). He also endorses (T1): ‘When something is needed it 
must…always be possible to specify what it is needed for’ (1984, p. 3). 
6 The words ‘end’, ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ are included in (T3) and (T4) because 
instrumentalists use one or more of these terms when stating their own position. As in 
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the source literature, I leave unaddressed the question of whether these terms are 
interchangeable. 
7 For beings capable of desire, many of their ends, goals and purposes will presumably 
derive from, or even, if Smith (1994, p. 116) is right, be, desires. Millgram (1997, p. 11) 
holds that ‘one cannot desire at will’. This article is neutral about that. As part of his 
argument, Millgram (1997 pp. 14–23, 28–31, 33–35) appeals to the imagined case of a 
pill that is supposed, presumably to the knowledge of the taker, when taking it, to result 
in a desire had ‘at pill’. Millgram (1997, p. 15) thinks that, in fact, the inferential 
commitments involved in desires mean there could be no desire had at pill unless the 
taker forgot having, in order to induce the intended desire, taken the pill (which might 
be achieved, for example, if the pill also had this memory-cancelling effect), or the taker 
came to think that there were independent reasons for the desire, or if the taker ‘suffers 
a failure of rationality’. Now an agent could, on my account of what an absolute need is, 
take a pill that results in the agent having an absolute need that would not have been had 
but for having taken the pill. Suppose, for example, that the pill contains a poison for 
which there is an antidote. If I take the pill, then, I will have an absolute need for the 
antidote. That situation has come about because –and this is a casual ‘because’– I took 
the poisonous pill. Now even if, in doing so, I wanted (e.g., as part of an experiment) to 
end up in need of the antidote, this need is, in the sense relevant to this article, 
independent of my having taken the pill. On an absolutist conception, if I have just 
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taken the pill then I now need the antidote no matter what my desires are now. An 
absolute need is absolute not because it is causally independent of a desire (although I 
would contend that many such needs are so independent) but because it is ontologically 
independent of ends, goals and purposes (whether these are construed, as Smith 
construes goals, as intentions or merely in a teleological manner). In the case of 
instrumental needs, if these depend ontologically on desires and desires cannot normally 
be had ‘at pill’, then neither can instrumental needs. 
8 E.g., Gustavsson (2014, p. 23) writes: ‘[T]he crucial difference is between writers who 
claim that all needs are instrumental (taking the form of “x needs y in order to z”) and 
those who deny this claim and argue that some needs are categorical or dispositional 
(taking the form “if x really needs y then x needs y, period”).’ As we shall see in §2, the 
arguments for instrumentalism that are in the literature include the premise (sometimes 
regarded as a sufficient condition for instrumentalism) that everything needed is needed 
for something. 
9 Compare Gustavsson’s remark (2014, p. 26), that ‘the relevant difference between [the 
two positions] is not whether there are one or two concepts of need but rather how z is 
understood [in the schema “x needs y in order to z”]’: that is to say, on what fills the z-
place. The difference between Gustavsson and me here is that he interprets the schema 
as requiring that the z-place must always be filled by a term that refers to a goal even 
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when the schema is applied to the absolutist position. Absolutism as I have 
characterized it is, on Gustavsson’s account, ruled out of logical space. 
10 White (1975, pp. 105, 121) holds that needs relate to end-states, but by ‘end-states’ he 
appears to mean all outcomes whatever. Brandon (1993, p. 127, note 3) appears to back 
this interpretation. By contrast, Thomson (1987, p. 129 note 4), Wiggins (1991, p. 7) 
and Ramsay (1992, p. 3) appear to take White to be an instrumentalist. This may be 
because White endorses (T1) and (T2). (T1) and (T2) do not, however, entail 
instrumentalism (as the main text makes clear). In fairness to Wiggins, he perhaps 
characterizes White not as an instrumentalist, but as a philosopher whose account of 
needs is broadly right for ‘purely instrumental needing’ but not for absolute needing. If 
by ‘end-state’ White means something more akin to the meaning of ‘outcome’ than to 
that of ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’, then White is no supporter of (T3). His commitment to (T1) 
is evident from the following remark: ‘If A needs to V, there must be something he has 
to V for (in order to, etc.)’ (1975, p. 103). White (1975, 105) endorses (T2). If I interpret 
White’s position correctly, he would agree that the conjunction of (T1) and (T2) does 
not entail (T3). As it happens, White also seems to reject (T4). If ends arise from 
choices and (T4) is true, then there cannot be mind-independent needs. Given that 
White (1975, pp. 105, 111) associates ends (as opposed to end-states) with choice and 
takes it that there are mind-independent needs, he is precluded from endorsing (and 
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never in fact says anything that commits him to) the claim that all needs are 
instrumental. 
11 David Seedhouse, the author of the foreword to Liss’s book, approvingly remarks 
(Liss 1993, p. 2) that on Liss’s account health care needs owe their existence to chosen 
goals. The influence of absolutist writing on needs from the 1980s has evidently not 
been so pervasive as to prevent philosophers in subsequent decades from subscribing 
even to the dependency of needs upon preferences, still less to the essentially 
instrumental character of all needing. 
12 This does not require that are such objects as needs: rather, it leaves unanswered the 
question of the ontological status of needs with respect to category distinctions in 
metaphysics. 
13 Gustavsson & Sandman (2015, p. 14) have it that the instrumental nature of need is a 
matter of ‘conceptual structure’. Juth (2015, p. 74, note 3) writes that: ‘the concept of 
need is always instrumental, but […] some needs […] have special moral force or give 
rise to legitimate claims [….] ‘‘categorical needs’’ is not a linguistic category, but a 
moral one’. Neither article appears to provide any original arguments for 
instrumentalism. Arguments, in other work, that are relevant to the issue of whether it is 
a conceptual truth that needs are always instrumental are discussed in the next section. 
14 On the idea that needing is needing for, compare White (1975, p. 103). 
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15 Premise 1 might well be disputed, along lines suggested by Wiggins (1991, pp. 7–9), 
but that avenue is not pursued here. It is evident that Flew intends his remark that ‘if I 
say that I need something it is never inept to ask: “What for?”’ (1981, p. 120) to 
illustrate a point about all need claims, not just first-person singular ones. He does not 
explain what he means by ‘inept’: he is probably alluding to the allegation of failure 
fully to grasp the semantics of some claims of need. 
16 Flew does not himself use the term ‘absolute’. He invalidly infers the hypothetically 
imperative nature of claims of need from his claim that ‘to say that this or that is needed 
is to say that it is a necessity for the fulfilment of some function, or purpose, or end’ 
(1981, p. 121). In the above reconstruction, the inclusion of 4 as a separate premise 
enables a valid argument to be reconstructed from his remarks. To say that some need 
claims are absolute, rather than hypothetically imperative, is not, of course, to say that 
those need claims are categorical imperatives; indeed, it is not to say that the need 
claims in question are in any sense imperatives. 
17 On this point, and the second example, compare Brandon (1993, p. 128) and McLeod 
(2011, pp. 220–221). 
18 Compare White (1975, p. 104). 
19 Compare von Wright (1963, p. 76; 1983, p. 3; 1986, p. 61); Plant (1980, p. 245). 
20 Hare’s remark (1969, p. 256) that ‘there is an intimate logical relation between what 
is needed and what is desired’ appears to be an allusion to such dependency. 
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21 Compare Hope, Østerdal & Hasman (2010, p. 472). 
22 The notion of ontological dependency is nuanced and it is not possible to explore it in 
detail here. Suffice it to say that the fact that A can exist only if B exists is insufficient 
for the ontological dependency of A upon B. Suppose that it is necessary that there are 
numbers. It follows that I can exist only if there are numbers. This hardly establishes, in 
any sense, that I owe my existence to that of numbers. See further Lowe (2010). 
23 Thanks to Christopher Bartley, Philip Goff, Simon Hailwood and especially Daniel 
Hill, Harry Lesser, Daniel Whistler and the anonymous referees for comments on 
previous versions. Thanks to the members of an audience at Durham University, 
especially the late E.J. Lowe (to whose memory I dedicate the article) and the late Soran 
Reader, for earlier discussion of some of the material. 
